I would add that if one looks under the covers in DOD and NASA, they will find guidelines for M&S firmly rooted in the work of some of the first computer/mathematical modelers who had enough computing power (duel processors) to even try to execute code for a simulation based on a model.
There are two strong sets of evidence to consider when looking at them. First, NASA has just majorly reviewed and updated theirs. It took time and was expensive. It was driven in part by failures in which models played a part some of which were catastrophic at least programmatically. But they also had had so many successes that lead to decided that it was worth keeping them albeit in updated more contemporary modeling terms. I suspect that the core rules were still the same.
Second, If you look at DOD B$$$$ have been and is being spent for modeling and simaliton, there is a great deal of guidance in the files. Important to note that in the files does not mean it is always used. The current document on VV&A (in fact the need for
Independent VV&A ) has evolved for over 40+ years. I suggest that the best evidence for the need for such guides is that in DOD, where the acquisition system is quite independent for the "governing" systems there have been great wastes of $ on failed modeling and simulation investment. Although the earliest very complex integrated models were for war gaming simulators or flight training systems whose creators knew that some discipline was essential. This was especially true if models were to ever be integrated into systems of models such as in the naval war game systems (NWGS and E (enhanced) NWGS) or a complete simulated aircraft. I will suggest that unlike NASA in the context above, little was ever seen of failures of DOD simulation but that many if not most failed in large part because the acquisition program managers chose, often quite explicitly, not to accept the cost or time it would have taken to following guidance. \
None the less, the discovery within the bio domain of M&S that lack of some shared discipline posed more risk to the future of the technology than was healthy is just a discovery of something that the for runners in M&S discovered or just expected from their earliest beginnings. Maybe and analog of their need to discipline their code to survive with other users in a MEG of core memory and 64K processor.
a few links among 5000 + hits on Google DMSO VV&A
VV&A Recommended Practices Guide - Modeling & Simulation ...
http://www.msco.mil/VVA_RPG.html
The Recommended Practices Guide (RPG) describes these VV&A processes from a number of perspectives. The RPG covers the different roles and ...
[PDF]
U.S. Coast Guard
http://www.uscg.mil/directives/ci/5000- ... 00_40.pdf
Dec 22, 2006 - (b) Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) VV&A Recommended Practices Guide. Build 2.5,
http://vva.dmso.mil.
Revisiting NASA's Recommended Practices Guide for Verification ...
http://www.aegistg.com/.../Revisiting%2 ... 0VV&A%...
Recommended Practices Guide for Verification, Validation and Accreditation ... According to the DMSO VV&A RPG, “M&S credibility is measured by verification ...[PDF]
The Use of M&S VV&A as a Risk Mitigation Strategy in Defense ...
http://www.scs.org/pubs/jdms/vol2num4/K ... 9-216.pdf
Summary: Justification is that if lots of people who live with modeling and simulation did not think rules were essential there would not have be MILLIONS, Maybe BILLIONS of dollars spent trying to codify them. So if bio sim does not have them (yet) they will and at least at the top level they will likely be the same ones DOD and NASA already have.